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It is a commonplace that large institutions and organisations often feature
positions which are costly but not associated with a productive activity (not
even supervision). The tasks associated with these positions may easily be
carried out by some other member of the existing work force. So, the position
seems redundant. In this paper, we argue how such positions might arise as a
second-best solution to an agency problem and suggest which value they con-
tribute. We explain why a seemingly useless additional worker is employed
for a task which could be carried out by the existing work force without
problems at lower costs.
The analysis deals with ”coping organisations” (Wilson 1989) in which nei-
ther actions nor output can be enforced directly by contracts. In these or-
ganisations, the problem of inducing eﬃcient actions and decisions is most
acute. Our analysis suggests that the additional position improves perfor-
mance because it allows to set more appropriate incentives. In particular,
we consider a situation where the only veriﬁable quantity is a signal which
confounds two decisions. Each of these decisions is related to a task and both
tasks need to be carried out to produce a beneﬁt. However, only one decision
is relevant for the beneﬁt. As an example, consider that the beneﬁt comes
from delivering a high quality service to a target audience. The ﬁrst task is
the service itself, the second task is to inform clients about the availability
of the service. Whoever carries out the service decides on its quality while
marketing can be done in a simple and cheap or a more expensive way, which
raises interest in the service even beyond the target audience. Now, suppose
that the demand for the service is the only observed variable. Then, a high
demand may result from a high quality of the service or from clients not
belonging to the target audience. In other words, the only observable signal
confounds the two decisions. Hence, using this signal to provide incentives to
a worker to deliver a high quality service is problematic. A single worker in
charge of both tasks might rather extend the client base instead of providing
a high quality service. In some sense, the worker engages in window dressing
by allocating too much resources to marketing. Thus, using the signal creates
an unwanted distortion.
This distortion can be eliminated by hiring a second worker. As the produc-
tion and signalling technology remain the same, there is a-priori no reason
1why the distortion should vanish. However, it becomes possible to use the
same single signal to provide incentives because workers decide interactively.
While a single worker cannot commit to refrain from window dressing, the
incentives to the two workers can be set in such a way that the result from
the interaction is the desired performance and not window dressing. Thus,
seemingly redundant positions can be explained as a solution to an incentive
problem when signals confound the decisions concerning diﬀerent tasks.
Prendergast (2000) also deals with the problem of inducing eﬃcient actions
in coping organisations. He points out that monitoring works less well in
such organisations than in the ﬁrst-best world. Under these conditions, op-
timal policies are characterised by attributes which are usually associated
with ineﬃcient bureaucracies: legitimate claims are ignored, too much un-
necessary monitoring occurs, too few errors are corrected, and decisions are
delayed. Our work links up to Prendergast’s ﬁndings and is complementary
in two ways. First, our ﬁndings concern diﬀerent elements of a bureaucracy,
namely, the above mentioned existence of seemingly redundant positions.
Second, this ﬁnding is rooted in the relationship between employer (or prin-
cipal) and workers (or agents) rather than in the triangle between principal,
agent, and client. In Prendergast’s model, clients are used to monitor the
agent. This monitoring is insuﬃcient, because clients ignore unjustiﬁed deci-
sions which are to their advantage. To overcome this problem, the principal
also conducts costly checks which randomly reveal the true situation. These
random checks are the driving force of Prendergast’s model. In our model, the
principal cannot utilise additional monitoring but she can create a new po-
sition, separate tasks, induce a game between the oﬃce holders, and thereby
improve incentives.
Our work also relates to Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), who consider the
problem of gathering information about an unknown dichotomous state of
the world. Because eﬀort is not observable and remuneration can only con-
dition on a decision, a single agent has less incentives to inform herself than
two agents which are made “advocates” for a particular state of the world.
Thus, the model shares with our model the idea that adding an additional
agent creates interaction which might be beneﬁcial. However, in our model
the second agent only helps to identify the contribution of the ﬁrst agent,
there is no other more direct beneﬁcial eﬀect of the interaction, and the tasks
of the agents don’t have to be related to gathering information.
2Like in our work, Athey and Roberts (2001) study the eﬀect of signals which
confound multiple actions. They derive implications on the allocation of deci-
sion rights and the design of incentive schemes, which ultimately may lead to
the endogenous formation of a hierarchy between two agents. In their model,
the number of agents is taken as ﬁxed, whereas we are particularly inter-
ested in the question when it makes sense to increase the work force. Their
analysis also diﬀers from ours as all actions have payoﬀ consequences for the
principal, while our model contains a decision which chieﬂy aﬀects the signal.
Because the agent has to make two decisions, which can be regarded as eﬀort
choices, the present work is related to the multi-tasking literature initiated
by the seminal work of Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991). It is known from
practice (Kerr 1975) and theory (Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom 1991) that disas-
trous distortions in the allocation of eﬀort between tasks can result in such
settings. The misallocation of eﬀort arises from uncertainty, the composition
of signals, or limited contract spaces (for examples see Feltham and Xie 1994,
Baker 2002; for an overview see Schnedler 2002) Here, misallocation is en-
tirely due to the structure of the signal and leads to a complete breakdown of
incentives in a single agent setting. Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991) identify
two causes for the breakdown of incentives: (i) some tasks are contractible
while others are not (ii) some tasks are more precisely measured than others.
The reason here falls in neither of the two categories: it is the impossibility
to identify the eﬀort from the signal which leads to the breakdown.
The introduction of an additional worker to overcome an observational prob-
lem bears similarity to the model of Strausz (1997), where a second agent
is brought into a hidden-action model to overtake monitoring activities. In
principle, the monitoring could also be undertaken by the principal but she
has an incentive to misrepresent the result to her advantage. By oﬀering
a contract to an external monitor without vested interest, a commitment
to monitor becomes possible. The mechanism underlying this commitment
is similar to the mechanism which underpins our result: an interaction be-
tween two parties replaces a joint decision and the interactive character rules
out certain undesired actions. In the setting of Strausz, the player with the
commitment problem is the principal in our setting it is the agent. The
solution to the commitment problem in Strausz’s setting is an middleman
between principal and agent which acts on behalf of the principal and forms
3an additional hierarchical layer. A casual observer “understands” the role of
the additional employee in a hierarchy: this employee monitors the working
agent in place of the principal. We provide a rationale why an additional
employee improves incentives even if it is not her task to supervise.
The following section sets up the model. Then, in Section 3, we derive the
optimal contract for the one-agent case and show that it is not leading to the
eﬃcient eﬀort allocations. Next, in Section 4, we compute the optimal con-
tract for the two-agent case in which the eﬃcient allocation can be induced.
In Section 5, we discuss the (negative) eﬀects of collusion and in Section
6, we explain under which conditions the principal can overcome collusion.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The modelling framework
Consider a principal, who draws a beneﬁt from the execution of two tasks.
The beneﬁt to the principal is conditional on both tasks being performed
and depends on how the two tasks are performed. Lacking time or skills, the
principal oﬀers one or many agents a contract to carry out the tasks.
As long as at least one agent works on each task, this creates a seizable ben-
eﬁt for the principal which more than oﬀsets the agents’ costs. Assuming
that it can be veriﬁed whether an agent works on a task, a contract can be
written which reimburses the agent and stipulates work on all tasks. If the
costs of hiring an additional agent κ exceed the productivity gain from this
agent, there is no reason to hire more than a single agent. However, the prin-
cipal in our model has a second interest: she wants the work to be done in a
particular way, as this aﬀects the beneﬁt she gets. The way how the work is
carried out is beyond direct contractual enforcement. The remainder of the
paper examines how to provide incentives for agents to improve performance
on the two tasks, under the assumption that both tasks need to be performed.
To explain the costs and beneﬁts from the diﬀerent ways how the tasks are
handled, we consider the case, where only a single agent works for the prin-
cipal. Later, we extend the framework to multiple agents. The agent has to
decide how to carry out task I and task II. These action choices are denoted
by aI and aII. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two ways how
4each task can be carried out: aI ∈ {0,1} and aII ∈ {0,1}. The agent dislikes
the high options; this is modelled by costs cj, which are incurred by the agent
when choosing the high option on task j: aj = 1. The disutility from the
high option is larger for the ﬁrst task: cI > cII > 0. On the other hand, the
principal’s beneﬁt increases by bI, when the agent performs high on the ﬁrst
task (aI = 1), while there is a lower gain bII from high performance on the
second task (aII = 1). The gains occur only if the respective high action has
been chosen. The beneﬁt increase from the ﬁrst task action outweighs the
costs of high performance, so that there is even scope to hire a second agent:
bI > cI + κ. High performance on the ﬁrst task is eﬃcient. On the other
hand, high performance on the second task is ineﬃcient: bII < cII. The latter
assumption is not crucial; most results hold without it. However, it simpli-
ﬁes the exposition if performance is desired on one and not on the other task.
Think of a two-step production process. First, the agent works on a machine
which produces an item. Second, the item is painted by the agent. From the
result, it is obvious whether the two steps have been carried out. However,
the steps can be carried out in diﬀerent ways. The agent may be sloppy or
accurate when producing, also he may add a second layer of paint. Both
activities are costly to the agent, but being accurate while producing is more
diﬃcult than adding the extra layer of paint. The principal is interested in
longevity of the ﬁnal product, which is determined by accurate production
rather than a second layer of paint. Optimally, the agent would work accu-
rately and add only a single layer of paint.
While it is generally observable that the agent works on a task, it is not
observable how he performs. It is thus questionable, whether the eﬃcient
performance can be achieved. In fact, it is impossible to convince the agent
to perform well on the ﬁrst task when he is not rewarded for it. To reward
the agent, we need some contractible quantity. Usually, there is some infor-
mation available which is related to performance but often this information
is systematically disturbed. Here, we assume that the following signal s is
available, which mixes the contribution of the two actions:
s :=





Some words about this signalling technology and its relation to beneﬁt cre-
ation are in order. This model describes the frequently found situation that
5the actual objective may be felt by the principal in form of a beneﬁt increase
and by the agent in form of costs but is hidden from the eye of an external
observer. Thus contracts, which need to be enforced by an external institu-
tion, cannot be based on this information. But the observer does have some
“impression”. This impression is modelled by the signal s. However, the im-
pression does not only depend on the performance in question aI but also on a
“masking” action aII. It is this confounding signal which is used in contracts.
In the example of the two-step process, inaccurate production might lead
to ﬁssures. With a single layer of paint, the ﬁssures can be detected and
the worker can be held responsible. However, the ineﬃcient second layer of
paint covers up ﬁssures. So there are three ways of producing a good look-
ing product (high signal): accurate production, two layers of paint, or both.
Only if the agent produces inaccurately and applies a single layer, the bad
performance becomes apparent.
The signal gives the principal some scope to provide incentives. She can set
two transfers depending on the state of the signal t1 which is paid whenever
the signal takes on the high value (s = 1) and t0 which is handed to the
agent given the low signal (s = 0).
3 One-agent case
To ﬁnd the optimal contract, we assume that the principal is the mechanism
designer and that the rationality of the agent is represented in form of an
incentive constraint. A participation constraint ensures that the principal
does actually create surplus and is not simply exploiting the agent. For sim-
plicity, the outside option of the agent is standardised to zero.
Given the signal, the principal maximises the joint surplus subject to the
incentive and participation constraint:
max
t1,t0
bIaI + bIIaII − (t1 − t0)max{aI,aII} − t0
such that (aI,aII) ∈ argmax(˜ aI,˜ aII)(t1 − t0)max{˜ aI,˜ aII} + t0 − ˜ aIcI − ˜ aIIcII
and (t1 − t0)max{aI,aII} + t0 − aIcI − aIIcII ≥ 0.
Because the signal is positively associated with the desired high performance
on the ﬁrst task, a ﬁrst intuition might be to reward the agent for the high
6signal. Re-considering the example, intuition suggests that once the agent is
rewarded for a good looking product, he will produce it in the cheapest and
not necessarily in the best way. So production will be inaccurate and the
agent will cover it up with a second layer of paint. Formally, the following
result holds:
Result 1 (Window-dressing by a single agent). If there is a single agent
and t1 − t0 ≥ cII, the agent chooses aI = 0 and aII = 1
Proof. The cheapest way to secure a high signal by the agent is to exert
aII = 1. This costs only cII, whereas the eﬃcient action aI = 0 is more
expensive: cI > cII. Choosing aII = 1 to get the high signal suﬃces to
secure t1. Picking aI = 1 only inﬂicts additional costs on the agent. The
agent prefers the high signal to the low signal, if the corresponding transfer
diﬀerence t1 − t0 more than pays for the costs of obtaining this signal. We
computed these costs to be cII and they are lower.
Of course, principal and agent foresee the incentive of the agent not to exert
the productive eﬀort but to engage in window dressing. Incentivising the
agent to perform well on the second task is costly (cII), while the respective
beneﬁts are meager (bII). Principal and agent loose cII − bII > 0 from a
scheme which rewards the agent (t1 − t0 ≥ cII). Thus, the optimal choice in
the single agent case is to give up on incentives:
Result 2 (No incentive provision). In the single agent case, it is optimal
to choose the transfers such that: t1 − t0 < cII.
Proof. By the previous result t1 − t0 ≥ cII leads to aII = 1. This results in
costs cII, beneﬁt bII, and a loss of cII − bII > 0. If t1 − t0 < cII, the agent
has no incentive to choose a high action (aI = aII = 0). The respective costs,
beneﬁt, and losses are zero. So, it is optimal not to provide incentives.
The ability of the agent to cover up bad performance on the ﬁrst task by a
good performance on the second task undermines any well-meant incentive
scheme. An obvious solution would be to prohibit the agent from doing the
second task. This is no option in our setting because the principal prefers
a bad performance on the second task to no performance at all: the second
task needs to be carried out because it is essential for production. However,
the principal can hire a second agent for the second task. This avenue will
be explored in what follows.
74 Two-agent case
When there are multiple agents, it needs to be speciﬁed, who determines
which action. In reality, the problem is not so much to assign agents to tasks
but to ensure that the assignment has binding character. This can be done by
withholding material needed for this task, not granting access to a locality at
which the task has to be performed, or not training or preparing the worker
to carry out the task. In other words, the principal controls the access of
agent i to task j. Let αi
j = 1 denote that agent i is enabled to carry out an
action at task j and αi
j = 0 the opposite. Due to the production technology,




for j =I,II. But what happens if two agents work on the same task? Then,
we have to deﬁne the action aj at task j, which results from the actions ai
j
and ak
j taken by agents i and k. We abstract from this issue by assuming that
there is at most one agent working on each task:
P
i αi
j = 1 for j =I,II. In
addition, we only consider a maximum of two agents. All these assumptions
are not essential but facilitate the exposition. Basically, the problem for the
principal now boils down to sticking with agent A and granting him access
to both tasks or hiring an additional agent B at costs κ and transferring the
responsibility of one task to agent B.
Note, that the costly hiring of agent B entails no direct beneﬁt. Moreover,
it is not obvious, why it can help to solve the incentive problem for agent
A. Transferring task II from agent A to B prevents agent A from masking
sluggishness on task I, but the structure of the signal stays the same: there
is still one signal confounding the two tasks. So, if the principal sees the
“good” signal, she still does not know, whether it results from the desired
performance or not. Without loss of generality, we suppose that agent A
works on task I and agent B on task II. To denote that transfers can depend
on the identity of the agent, we use an additional index: ti
s is the transfer
received by agent i when the signal is s. Using this notation, we can write
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Table 1: Interaction between Agent A and B
This game represents individual rationality in the maximisation pro-
gramme. The ﬁrst payoﬀ in each payoﬀ pair relates to agent A, the
second payoﬀ to agent B.
tively between agents. This disciplines the agent on task I in a way which is
not possible in the single agent case. Moreover, the principal has substantial
inﬂuence on the structure of the game. For example she can reward agent A
for the high signal to elicit the high action at task I while punishing agent
B for the same signal to avoid window dressing on the behalf of the latter.
Using such a scheme, the eﬃcient outcome can be achieved as a solution to
the two-agent maximisation programme.
Result 3 (Unique eﬃcient equilibrium). The eﬃcient allocation (aI =
1,aII = 0) is implemented as the unique Nash-equilibrium of the game from
Table 4, if transfers a chosen such that tA
1 − cI ≥ tA
0 and tB
1 − cII ≤ tB
0.
Proof. Take transfers fulﬁlling the conditions. Observe that no agent has an
incentive to deviate from the eﬃcient allocation, while at least one agent will
deviate from any other allocation.
If the inequalities for the transfer scheme hold strictly, the eﬃcient allocation
is even a strict Nash-equilibrium. The implementation does not even have to
involve punishment for agent B: suppose B gets a ﬂat salary (tB
1 = tB
0 = 0),
then he has no incentive to choose the costly high action; if agent A obtains
a premium for the high signal (tA
1 ∈ (cI,bI] and tB
0 = 0), he will carry out the
desired action. By manipulating the transfers, the principal may obtain all
but the high cost allocation, (aI,aII) = (1,1), as an equilibrium – see Figure 1.
However, the surplus obtained from the other allocations is always lower
than the surplus from the eﬃcient allocation, which generates bI−cI−κ > 0.
The low-cost allocation, (aI,aII) = (0,0), leads only to a surplus of zero in















Figure 1: Implementable action pairs
Depending on the diﬀerence in transfers between the two signal outcomes
various action choices can be implemented. Most importantly, there are
transfers which uniquely implement the eﬃcient allocation, (aI,aII) =
(1,0).
allocation, (aI,aII) = (0,1), results in a surplus of bII − cII < 0, where an
additional κ has to be subtracted in the two-agent case.
So, the principal will hire agent B solely to provide incentives for agent A.
The idea of separating tasks to overcome incentive problems dates back to
the multitasking models of Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991), who rule out
this possibility. A decisive feature of the model here is that task separation
does not entail a separation of signals. Thus, hiring agent B in itself does
not create a meaningful signal but providing the right incentives to agent B
renders the signal meaningful for agent A’s action. In the language of the
initial example: agent B is neither rewarded nor punished for visible ﬁssures
and hence only uses one layer of paint. Consequently, ﬁssures will show up
when agent A worked inaccurately and the ﬁnal state of the product may be
used to provide incentives for A.
This logic is similar to the justiﬁcation of advocates put forward by Dewa-
10tripont and Tirole (1999). Whereas in Dewatripont and Tirole’s model the
second agent contributes directly to overall surplus and there are thus po-
tentially two reasons to hire this agent: incentives and work load sharing.
In our setting, as agent B does not directly contribute to the surplus, he
is employed merely for incentive reasons. As the only veriﬁable bit for an
outside observer is the signal and as agent B has no incentive to improve
appearance, it looks as if agent B is reducing productivity; products which
looked impeccable, now may exhibit ﬁssures.
Since the signalling technology is not altered by hiring the second agent, the
implementation of the eﬃcient allocation is vulnerable to an arrangement
in which the two agents act as if they were one agent. In other words, the
two agents might collude and thereby undermine the incentive scheme. This
problem is explored in the following section.
5 Collusion
For a successful collusion, there must exist some deviation from the imple-
mented actions which improves the joint situation of both agents under the
given contractual arrangement. In other words, the sum of the transfers re-
ceived by both agents minus the costs must be larger for the deviating actions
than for the prescribed actions. The obvious deviation candidate is window
dressing: the ﬁrst agent chooses the low action and the second agent chooses
the high action, so that they save the costs for the expensive ﬁrst task and
only have to pay for the cheaper second task. In our setting, if the two agents
decide to maximise their joint pay-oﬀ, they can be better oﬀ.
Result 4. If the two agents collude and maximise their joint pay-oﬀs, there
exists a deviation from the eﬃcient allocation which is proﬁtable for the
agents.
Proof. The maximisation problem of the joint payoﬀ is identical to the max-
imisation problem of a single agent from Result 1. Thus, the window dressing
allocation maximises the joint payoﬀ. If agent A chooses the low action and
agent B commits to the high action, the signal remains high. So, the joint
received transfers of the agents remain the same. However, the costs to them
are reduced by cI − cII.
11So, if agents can collude, they obstruct the incentive scheme and switch from
the productive allocation to window dressing. This should not surprise be-
cause agents share all costs and beneﬁts and hence act as if they were a single
agent.
Collusion is a collective action: agents need to commit to behave coopera-
tively. However, their self interest may not be aligned with their joint inter-
est. Hence, some commitment device becomes necessary to make collusion
enforceable. In our setting we need a double-sided commitment.
Result 5 (Double-sided commitment for collusion). If and only if the
second agent can commit to the window-dressing activity and the ﬁrst agent
can commit to compensate the second agent, collusion can be sustained.
Proof. Under a payment scheme which fulﬁls tA
1 − cI ≥ tA
0 and tB
1 − cII < tB
0,
agent B is individually better oﬀ when choosing the low action. Collusion
is only proﬁtable when it leads to window dressing. But window dressing
requires agent B to carry out the high action. This is why the commitment
of B to the high action is necessary. It is only optimal for agent B to commit,
if he gets at least reimbursed for the costs of this action cII. So, agent A
must simultaneously with B commit to pay agent B. Simultaneity is required
because the second-mover would have no incentive to commit. If both agents
can simultaneously commit, this leads to window dressing and hence both
agents have an incentive to do so.
How can the double commitment be enforced? If agent A and B are in-
teracting inﬁnitely many times and suﬃciently patient, they could punish
each other in case of a deviation. However, in such a setting the principal is
likely to be engaged in inﬁnitely repeated interactions as well. In order to
explain collusion, one thus has to explain, why the principal cannot ﬁnd a
self-enforcing agreement with the agents. More plausibly, the double com-
mitment may be enforced from an external agency, which is not accessible
to the principal. If the principal is law-abiding and the agents are not, the
contract could be enforced using an illegal enforcement institution like the
Maﬁa. In any case, it is crucial that the agents can do something which the
principal cannot do: they must be able to contract on the second action aII.
In other words, they have a richer contract space. This, however, is not the
only requirement. The collusion contract between the agents must also be
12hidden to the external world. Otherwise, the principal could disallow collu-
sion. The principal seems to be more likely to spot a collusion, if she deals
with both agents rather than just with a single agent. Accepting this claim,
hierarchical relationships between the agents (Kofman and Lawarree 1993,
Strausz 1997, Olsen and Torsvik 1998) are more prone to collusion, than the
situation considered here.
But what if agents nevertheless ﬁnd some way to commit and hence collude?
The next section examines what the principal can do if agents can secretly
write contracts on action aII, while the principal cannot.
6 Heterogeneous agents
Assume that agents are facing a richer contract space than the principal and
unlike the latter are able to contract upon the second task action. As we have
seen in the previous section, this opens up the possibility of collusion. In this
section, we consider how the possibility of having heterogeneous agents, who
are not equally good at all tasks, may alter our results.
We previously assumed that the costs cI and cII did not vary with the agent’s
identity. Here, we relax this assumption and index costs by the agent’s iden-
tity: ci
j is the costs of agent i at task j. These costs are observable to the
principal, so that she can carry out allocation of tasks according to costs.
In order to make the setup more interesting, we assume that agent B is
strictly worse than agent A. That is, even at the cheaper second task, this
agent has higher costs than agent one: cA
I < cB
II. Considering these costs,
the hiring costs of κ, and neglecting any incentive eﬀects, there would be no
reason to employ agent two. However, it is precisely the incompetence of
agent two even at task two which make him valuable for implementing the
eﬃcient solution.
Theorem 1 (Unique eﬃcient outcome under collusion). Given the







0 implements the eﬃcient equilibrium as a unique and collusion-proof
equilibrium.
Proof. By Result 3, a transfer scheme fulﬁlling the above inequalities leads to
13the implementation of the eﬃcient activities in a unique equilibrium. So all
that remains to be shown is that the equilibrium is collusion-proof. Again,
the most proﬁtable deviation which agents may achieve jointly is the window-
dressing situation where agent one does nothing aI = 0 and agent two masks
the inactivity aII = 1 (agent one cannot do the window-dressing because he
lacks the training). By this deviation, the superﬁcial appearance does not
change the signal (s = 1) and the sum of transfers received by the agents
remains the same. On the cost side, the agents now jointly incur cB
II which is
above cA
I . Hence, the costs of this deviation are larger than the gains.
Observable heterogeneity amongst agents thus helps to implement the ef-
ﬁcient activity. The observable characteristics of this implementation are
absurd: the principal employs a seemingly superﬂuous worker for a task
which is essential but at which the worker is particularly bad while at the
same time, the task could be overtaken by the existing work-force. If high
performance were eﬃcient on the second task but performance on the ﬁrst
task were more important, the principal might even forego eﬃciency on the
second task and pay the second agent to be destructive, only to set the right
incentives.
But not all phenomena around confounded signals are necessarily negative.
There is a less grim interpretation of the exceedingly high costs of agent B
to carry out the masking: agent B might be morally inhibited to act against
the principal and to cover up for agent A’s poor performance.
7 Conclusion
Creating a team when a single worker can do the job has several disadvan-
tages. There might be problems of coordination and it can become more
diﬃcult to identify individual contributions which complicates the provision
of incentives. This is particularly true, if there are no individual performance
signals but only a common one. The setting analysed here features only a
single common signal and there are no economies of scope or scale from hiring
a second worker. Intuitively, there is thus no reason to employ more than
one worker. However, we have shown that hiring another worker does not
always blur the signal but may actually help to identify the contribution of
the ﬁrst worker; it is in the interest of all involved parties to incur costs and
14hire the additional worker because it then becomes possible to provide bet-
ter incentives for the ﬁrst worker. Hence, the sole purpose of the additional
worker is to enable the operation of a proﬁtable incentive scheme.
The presence of the new worker alters the incentives because the ﬁrst worker’s
action is now exposed. A single worker has all reason to cover up bad work;
once working with a second worker, it becomes considerably more compli-
cated to hide sluggishness. The second worker has no reason to straighten
the matter out for the sluggish worker –unless they achieve an informal agree-
ment. Informal agreements are only possible under special conditions. We
have seen that even under these conditions, collusion can be avoided by the
selection of an appropriate co-worker: someone who is unable or unwilling to
engage in window-dressing.
The importance of the co-worker is concealed to the eye of a superﬁcial
observer: the worker is neither controlling the ﬁrst worker nor reporting to
the employer. Also, looking merely at the actual productivity, the additional
worker seems superﬂuous; the contribution to production of this worker is
negligible and below costs. Moreover, the second worker seems to be badly
incentivised as he is not rewarded for a good-looking ﬁnal product. As we
have seen, collusion can be prevented if the second worker is not very good
at improving appearance. In other words, it looks as if an incompetent agent
is hired to ﬁll a seemingly superﬂuous position. To the initial worker, the
additional worker appears like a bureaucrat who is just doing his job and
is unwilling or unable to collude and ﬁnd a pragmatic solution which could
increase the workers’ joint welfare. On a broader context, however, once
we consider the employer’s welfare too, the presence of the second worker is
indeed eﬃcient. Once the employer’s utility is incorporated, the second cook
still looks unnecessary but in fact helps saving the broth.
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